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~~SECRET~~ (when filled in)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

[redacted] 3.5(c)

Classified by [illegible]. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5(b)(1). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

● PRIORITY
IN: 020110
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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET [redacted] 3.5(c)

DIST 25 AUGUST 1976

REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E~~ T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED- [redacted]

[redacted] 3.5(c)

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/CUBA

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: BELIEF [redacted] THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING THE TWO CUBANS ON 9 AUGUST: BELIEF

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

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2. EMILIO A R A G O N E S, AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA FROM CUBA, TOLD THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA THAT IF THE CUBAN EMBASSY CAN OBTAIN EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PICKING UP THE TWO CUBANS ON 9 AUGUST 1976; ARAGONES WILL DEMAND THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ALLOW HIM TO TALK TO THEM. ARAGONES DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TWO CUBANS HAD VOLUNTARILY DESERTED, STATING THAT THEY WERE GOOD COMMUNISTS AND THAT IF THEY SIGNED ANY LETTER REQUESTING ASYLUM OR DENOUNCING CUBA, THEY DID IT UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE.

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

4. CUBAN COMMERCIAL OFFICERS IN BUENOS AIRES [redacted] 3.3(b)(1) BELIEVE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING THE TWO CUBANS.

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

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3.3(b)(1)

5. SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TWO CUBANS, SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY. THOSE WHICH RELATE TO THE CUBAN COMMERCIAL OFFICE INCLUDE KEEPING THE RECEPTION DOOR CLOSED UNTIL IT IS KNOWN WHO WISHES TO ENTER; RECEIVING VISITORS IN THE OUTER OFFICE ONLY; AND SEARCHING PURSES AND PACKAGES OF VISITORS.

3.3(b)(1)

SECURITY MEASURES

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1) INCLUDE NOT LEAVING THE EMBASSY UNESCORTED; NOT LEAVING A PLACE OF RESIDENCE UNTIL AN OFFICIAL ESCORT CAR HAS ARRIVED; LIMITING OUTINGS WITHIN THE CAPITAL AND TRIPS TO THE INTERIOR OF ARGENTINA TO ONLY THOSE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL; CHECKING THE STREETS FOR SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES PRIOR TO LEAVING THE EMBASSY.

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8. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

THE TWO CUBANS WERE PICKED UP AND LATER KILLED BY THE ARGENTINE STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). GOVERNMENT SECURITY ELEMENTS WERE ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR SENDING A LETTER AND IDENTITY DOCUMENTS OF THE TWO CUBANS TO A LOCAL PRESS OFFICE TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO CUBANS HAD DEFECTED.)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted] 3.5(c)

[redacted] 3.5(c)

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